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We present a two-period model in which an employee searches for busi-
ness projects in a changing environment. An employee who discovers a
profitable project in period 1 is reluctant to search again in period 2
because the old project may continue to be profitable. Management’s
response to this inertial tendency is either to increase the financial incen-
tives to encourage searching or to accept no searching. The former
response increases search efforts and total profits; the latter response has
the opposite results. Inertia can be removed by restructuring the firm in
period 2, but this may create a time-inconsistency problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
Innovation is a major source of competitive advantage and a key determinant
of firm survival in many industries. Still, empirical evidence suggests that
firms tend to maintain the status quo for too long, thereby losing market
shares and missing out on new business opportunities. These inertial tenden-
cies appear to be more pronounced in successful firms, and business history is
fraught with examples of market leaders that failed as market conditions took
a critical turn; see Chesbrough (2003) and the references cited therein.
One question surrounding the notion of inertia is why firms appear to be
unable or unwilling to provide contractual or organizational incentives for
employees to look for new business opportunities. Kaplan and Henderson
(2005) argue that firms’ incentive schemes are multi-faceted and require
careful thought and adjustment to the environment. Thus, a change in the
environment that calls for a new strategy may cause existing incentive systems
to be less effective managerial instruments. This appears to apply especially
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to incentive systems designed to motivate innovation which tend to be more
complex than the schemes aimed at running existing assets well (Manso,
2011). While these are important observations, the contractual challenges are
not tied naturally to past success.
In this paper, we offer an agency-based explanation for why firms with
records of success are particular prone to experiencing inertial tendencies
among their employees and why monetary incentives may be ineffective for
facilitating change. In contrast to most of the existing literature, we take a
dynamic perspective on inertia. We show that inertial tendencies among
employees are costly to the firm ex post, but that their cost may be out-
weighed by the higher levels of effort provided ex ante.
We develop a simple, two-period principal–agent model in which the
firm’s management hires an employee for two periods to search for and to
implement a project in each period. Management neither observes the
employee’s search process nor the details of the project, so the only incentive
scheme available is payment of a bonus to the employee if the project is
successful. The firm operates in a changing environment, which makes it
difficult to design robust, long-term incentive schemes. Hence, incentives are
offered on a period-by-period basis.
Success in the first period creates the tendency for the firm to stay on
the current course of action in the second period. The underlying reason is
a moral hazard problem, which is particular to successful firms: since the
current project may continue to be successful, it is tempting for the
employee to continue with this project rather than to invest effort in search-
ing for a new one. Note that monetary incentives are ineffective in resolving
this agency problem since a bonus increases the pay-off both from searching
for a new project and from staying with the old one. Inertia is said to arise
whenever this moral hazard problem reduces profit in the second period
compared with a benchmark in which it is possible to tie project choice to
employee search.1
We show that circumstances exist when the employee’s possibility to
reemploy a previously successful project exacerbates the agency problem and
causes inertia. Management reacts to this problem in one of two ways: either
to encourage searching by offering a higher bonus or refraining completely
from incentivizing search efforts. These two possible reactions have very
different implications for the parties involved. If searching is encouraged,
search efforts are stimulated, but not only in the second period. The employee
foresees that first-period success results in higher-powered incentives and
greater informational rents in the second period compared with failure and,
thus, exerts higher search effort also in the first period. The employee’s
1Thus, our definition of inertia captures the existence of an inertial tendency inside the firm,
independently of how this tendency is manifested in the choices made by principal and
agent.
reluctance to search again commits management to offering a higher reward
for second-period success, which results in higher total pay-offs to employee
and firm compared with the benchmark. However, if it is too costly to
incentivize searching, search efforts in both periods are reduced, leading to
lower total pay-offs to employee and firm. This illustrates how focusing only
on the negative effects of inertia ex post may miss important dynamic effects
that appear ex ante.
Management also may employ organizational measures in order to
manage inertia and to improve profit. We show that allowing the employee to
appropriate a larger fraction of the project value as private benefits, e.g.
through limiting monitoring of how projects are run, increases the parameter
space in which reluctance to search becomes a beneficial commitment device
for management. Another set of measures, aimed at removing inertia com-
pletely, includes the restructuring of tasks, job rotation and intermittent
employee replacement. For example, job rotation in the second period forces
all employees, including those who were successful in the first period, to
search for a profitable project in their new area of responsibility. While
restructuring increases second-period profit by removing inertia, it increases
overall profit only if inertia results in no searching in the second period. Then
management may face a time-inconsistency problem and may try to find ways
to commit to not restructuring.
The paper is organized as follows. Below we discuss the related litera-
ture. Section 2 presents the basic model. In Sections 3 and 4 the model is
solved, inertia is defined, and the consequences of inertia are discussed.
Different ways of responding to inertia—and the hazards of doing so—are
discussed in Section 5. Alternative contracting assumptions are discussed in
Section 6, and Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
1.1 Related Literature
Various works in industrial organization, organizational theory and manage-
ment strategy identify reasons why established firms may fail to pursue and
adopt innovation (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). In the industrial organization
literature, the focus is on market competition, and it has been argued that an
incumbent firm has less incentive to invest in product innovation because the
new product will replace the old one (Arrow, 1962; Reinganum, 1983). Orga-
nizational theorists, however, stress that structures and routines, which
improve performance in a stable environment, are difficult to alter in the face
of environmental change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and reduce the scope
of search (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Furthermore,
even if an innovation is identified, the decision to adopt it has important
redistributional effects within the organization and, thus, is liable to creating
time-consuming and costly influence activities (Pfeffer, 1982; Meyer et al.,
1992). Finally, the strategy literature emphasizes that incumbent firms’
relationships with suppliers and customers may cause them to miss disruptive
technologies that initially appear to be of no interest to current customers or
which require different suppliers (Christensen, 1997).
These theories of inertia tend to focus on the point in time when the
inertial tendencies already exist inside the firm. We would argue that inertia
is a phenomenon that is inherently dynamic and should be analyzed in a
dynamic framework. With the notable exception of Boyer and Robert (2006),
we are not aware of other formal analyses that address the dynamic aspects
of innovation and inertia. Boyer and Robert (2006) consider a two-period
model in which a project is chosen in the first period. In the second period, a
more profitable project becomes available, but because its implementation
might result in additional rents to the agent, the principal may decide to
continue with the first-period project. This outcome is defined as inertia.
However, their model cannot capture why successful firms are particularly
prone to experiencing inertia. Also, the authors do not discuss organizational
solutions to manage inertia.
Our model shares some central features or assumptions with a number of
papers in different strands of the literature. The source of inertia in our model
is essentially a sunk cost problem: if the employee has searched for and found
a successful project in the first period, she has an incentive to try to save on
search costs in the second period. A similar sunk cost problem arises when the
employee invests her reputation in promoting the current project
(Prendergast and Stole, 1996).
In our model, we follow Kaplan and Henderson (2005) and assume
that underlying uncertainty regarding the environment prevents long-term
contracting. We extend this argument by providing a fully specified model
to analyze the implications of this assumption. Several studies explore dif-
ferent sources of contractual incompleteness that arise in an innovation
context and how they affect the management of innovation. Manso (2011)
shows that, under conventional incentive schemes, the high probabilities of
failure associated with innovation make these projects unattractive for
employees. Similarly, if the innovation falls outside the available perfor-
mance measures, employees may prefer standard tasks that can be measured
using existing performance indicators (Holmström, 1989; Hellmann and
Thiele, 2011).
The literature on dynamic moral hazard problems shows that the
optimal incentive scheme in a given period depends on past outcomes during
the employment relationship (Rogerson, 1985; Fudenberg et al., 1990). Our
framework differs from the standard moral hazard framework since high
performance by the employee exacerbates the moral hazard problem in the
next period. A general result in this literature is that deferred compensation
can be an efficient way to provide effort incentives to employees, and in
Section 6 we discuss why deferred compensation may also serve to avoid
costly inertia.
2 A MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA
2.1 Players
The management of a firm—the principal—hires an employee—the agent—
for two periods, t = 1, 2, to search for and implement profitable projects.
Management and employee are risk-neutral2 and respectively maximize
expected profit and utility. For simplicity, we set the common discount factor
to 1. The employee is credit and wealth constrained, so all compensation
payments must be non-negative. This is also the case in period 2 where any
first-period salary awarded to the employee is assumed to be consumed
before the start of the period.
2.2 Projects
In each of the two periods the employee pursues one from a continuum of
projects with a duration of one period. The projects we envisage represent
significant levels of innovation. They are not limited to new products but
include changes to production process, or marketing or distribution systems.
While the projects appear identical ex ante, in period t only one of the
projects is profitable with a value normalized to 1. This project is denoted xt∗.
All other projects are of zero value. The profitable project in period 1 may
also be the profitable project in period 2. The optimal projects in both periods
are identical with the probability α ∈ [0, 1]. One can envisage the comple-
mentary probability (1 − α) as the probability of a change in consumer
preferences or the technology frontier that requires major redirection of the
firm’s activities. In the following, we refer to the level of α as the degree of
stability of the firm’s environment.
We assume that management cannot extract the entire value of a prof-
itable project; a fraction (1 − θ) of this value is appropriated privately by the
employee. The employee’s benefit can be monetary or non-monetary in
nature. For example, if running the project involves an additional moral
hazard problem, (1 − θ) could be an informational rent that is paid to the
employee in order to realize the gross value of 1. Alternatively, it could be
that the employee runs the project in the way that benefits her career rather
maximizing the firm’s profit. In order to reduce the number of case distinc-
tions, but without loss of insight, it is assumed that θ ∈( )23 1, . Thus, the major
part of the project value is non-private.
2.3 Project Search
The employee is hired in each period in order to identify xt∗ and to implement
the project. Management is assumed not to be involved in the search process;
2The assumed risk-neutrality of the employee is not crucial for the results.
for example, because it does not have the required time or ability. The
employee’s search effort yields a signal about xt∗, xt. The signal is correct
with probability qt and incorrect with probability 1 − qt. If the signal is
incorrect, each of the projects of zero value is signaled with equal probability.
Because there is a continuum of projects, each of those projects is signaled
with probability zero. Acquiring information is costly for the employee. Her
private cost 12
2γ qt is increasing in the expected quality of the signal. We
assume that γ ≥ 1 in order to exclude corner solutions in the employee’s choice
of qt. Notice that an employee who identified x1∗ has two signals about the
identity of the profitable project in period 2, x1∗ and x2. These two signals are
assumed to be conditionally independent.
2.4 Information and Contracting
The search effort and the details of the implemented project are information
private to the employee. Hence, the two parties can contract neither on the
search effort exerted nor on the nature of the project. In the second period,
this implies that compensation cannot be made contingent on whether the
project implemented is the result of a search process and whether it is iden-
tical to x1∗.
The profit realized from the project is verifiable and is used as the basis
for a performance-sensitive compensation contract. However, the implemen-
tation of such a contract requires careful specification and measurement of
the individual employee’s contribution to profit. Due to events that are
unforeseen or difficult to describe, its specification is difficult ex ante and/or
costly in dynamic environments.3 This holds especially for the long-term,
because such contingencies arise over time and their relevance, therefore,
accumulates. To implement these notions in a simple way, we assume that
contracting is complete for one period but impossible for two.
Consistent with the above assumptions, management offers to the
employee at the beginning of each period, a compensation contract that
specifies a non-negative bonus, wt, in the event of strictly positive profit
during period t. The employee has a reservation utility equal to zero, so
management does not need to pay a fixed wage to ensure her participation.
2.5 Timing
The timing of decisions and events is depicted in Fig. 1.
3 THE SECOND PERIOD
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium in period 2 when inertia may
manifest itself. The focus, therefore, is on the cause and ex post consequences
3These reasons for contract incompleteness were early emphasized by Williamson (1985) (see also
Hart and Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999).
of inertia. Rather than solving separately for the equilibrium in the subgames
following first-period success and failure, we analyze a slightly more general
set-up that encompasses both subgames.
In the first period the employee has implemented a project x1 that is
known to be identical to x2∗ with probability β. In addition, she receives a
signal x2 that is conditionally independent of the signal x1 and that correctly
indicates x2∗ with probability q2.
Suppose that the employee searches for a new project, because she plans
to implement a project based on the signal x2. When choosing her search
effort, the employee maximizes:
q w q2 2 221
1
2
−( ) +[ ]−θ γ
trading off her expected benefit from searching—in the form of an exogenous
share of the project value, (1 − θ), and a bonus if successful, w2—with her
private search cost. Note however that any signal x2 that indicates the suc-
cessful project with a probability q2 below β is worthless, because the
employee ignores it when selecting among projects. Thus, the employee either
refrains from searching, which implies an expected utility of β[w2 + (1 − θ)], or
exerts sufficient search effort to ensure that q2 is greater than β. The following
lemma compares these two options.
Lemma 1: Suppose the employee knows a project x1 that is identical to x2∗
with probability β. If the following condition holds:
FIG. 1. Timing of Events and Decisions
w2 1
2
+ −( ) ≥θ
γ
β (1)
the employee exerts the effort q w w2 2 2 1( ) = + −( )[ ]θ γ and implements the
project x2. Otherwise, the employee does not search, q2 = 0, and implements
the project x1∗.
Notice that if β is sufficiently large, β θ γ≥ −( )1 2 , the wage necessary to
induce searching is increasing in β.
3.1 Benchmark: Verifiable Project Search
The novel feature of our framework is the employee’s possibility to imple-
ment x1 again, in period 2, without searching. Before turning to the full
model, let us consider a benchmark case where this possibility is removed. In
particular, we assume management is able to verify the signal from the new
search process, x2.4 Then management contractually can tie the choice of
project to the source of information. Specifically, management is able to
stipulate in the contract that the project x2 is implemented in period 2. We
still assume that the employee’s search effort cannot be verified.
By allowing management to specify that x2 is selected, the impact of x1
on second period project choice and, therefore, on the employee’s search
incentive is eliminated. Technically, this removes the search constraint (1)
from management’s problem. Management identifies the optimal contract by
comparing two arrangements: first, x2 is selected and w2 maximizes the
expected profit (θ − w2)q2(w2), and second, x1 is selected again and w2 = 0.
The following lemma summarizes the optimal contract and the pay-offs
in the benchmark case.
Lemma 2: (Benchmark) Suppose that it is possible to verify the signal from
the second-period search process, x2. If β θ γ≤ 1 4 , the optimal contract
stipulates that x2 is implemented in period 2 and specifies w2 12 2 1
b = −( )θ .
Otherwise, the optimal contract does not tie project selection in period 2 to x2


















4This requires not only management but also a court of law must be able to evaluate the
employee’s arguments in support of the project choice, and to judge whether these argu-






















The optimal contract stipulates that the signal generated by searching
determines the project chosen in period 2 for low values of β. For high values
of β, the first-period project is likely to be the successful project in period 2.
It is not profitable to induce the employee to exert sufficient effort that the
signal x2 is more informative about the optimal project than x1. Therefore,
the contract does not specify that project choice is tied to x2 and sets a zero
bonus in case of project success. It is then not optimal for the employee to
search for a new project.
3.2 The Equilibrium Contract
We now turn to the full problem where management has to take account of
the search constraint (1). One possible solution is to incentivize the employee
to search for a new project. Then management maximizes firm profit,
(θ − w2)q2(w2), subject to the search constraint (1). The alternative is not to
encourage searching and to set w2 = 0. Comparing these two solutions yields
the following equilibrium contract and pay-offs:







































































































The equilibrium contract is almost identical to the benchmark, except
for two cases. First, for 1 4 2 4γ β θ γ< ≤ −( ) the search constraint (1) binds in
the solution, and management optimally increases the bonus relative to the
one in the benchmark case in order to incentivize searching. Second, for
2 4 1 4−( ) < ≤θ γ β θ γ the option of proposing x1∗ without searching is so
attractive for the employee that the cost of inducing search effort outweighs
the associated benefit. Hence, there is searching in the benchmark case but
not in the full model where the set of feasible contracts is more restricted.
We can now formally define inertia within our framework:
Definition 1: Inertia arises for β γ θ γ∈( )1 4 1 4, where profit in the second
period is reduced relative to the benchmark because of the employee’s pos-
sibility to implement x1 without searching for a new project.
In other words, according to our definition, inertia arises whenever the
search constraint (1) affects the equilibrium outcome and results in lower
profit in the second period.5 When β θ γ≤ −( )2 4 , the signal created by the
first-period project is sufficiently imprecise to leave the employee’s search
incentives unaffected in equilibrium. In contrast, when β θ γ>1 4 , the signal
obtained through the first-period project is relatively precise and the profit
from implementing x1∗ again is high. Specifically, the profit is higher than the
profit that would result from the employee’s search effort even were her
search incentives not impaired by the knowledge of x1∗. In that case, there is
no inertia even though search is not undertaken in equilibrium.
The region of inertia diminishes in θ and disappears for θ = 1.6 To see
why, note from equation (5) that profit is independent of θ if searching by the
employee is induced but increasing in θ if no searching is induced. Therefore,
no searching becomes a more attractive option for management as θ
increases, which reduces the importance of the search constraint (1) and
diminishes the region of the parameter space in which inertia occurs.7
Lemma 3 allows us to relate the two first-period outcomes, project
failure and project success, to the occurrence of inertia. If the project failed in
the first period, then x x1 1≠ ∗ and β = 0; the project implemented in the first
period fails with probability 1 in the second period. This implies that there
5There is always a reluctance to exert search effort in principal–agent models of this type because
the employee carries the full cost of searching, but receives only a share of the benefit from
searching. However, the definition of inertia identifies the additional inertial tendency that
arises in our model because of the employee’s possibility to propose x1∗ without searching.
6Note that while the region of inertia decreases in θ, this does not carry over to the overall level
of agency cost as measured by the difference between the first-best and the second-best
effort. The first-best effort is independent of θ, but an increase in θ may either increase,
decrease or not affect the second-best effort depending on β (see also footnote 5).
7Inertia disappears for θ = 1, i.e. in the absence of private benefits of the employee. This is specific
to the concrete model assumptions. For example, there exist alternative effort cost func-
tions that generate inertia even for θ = 1.
is no inertia after first-period failure. Using the pay-offs in Lemma 3,
second-period bonus, firm profit and employee utility are given, respectively,
by w2 2 1 2f = −( )θ , π γ2 1 4f = and u2 1 4f = γ . Superscripts ‘f’ indicate first-
period failure.
If instead the project is successful, then x x1 1= ∗ and β = α. Inertia arises
for stable, but not overly stable firm environments. Second-period bonus,
profit and utility are given in Lemma 3 and are denoted by w2s α( ), π α2s ( ) and
u2s α( ) respectively. Superscripts ‘s’ indicate first-period success.
Since our primary interest is the effects of inertia, in the following we













4 THE FIRST PERIOD
Solving the game backwards in order to find the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium, we turn to the first-period decisions.
The employee considers the total (i.e. two-period) utility when choosing
q1. Hence, her first-period problem is:
q
q w u q u q
1




max + −( ) + ( )[ ]+ −( ) −{ }θ α γs f
which implies a search effort of:
q w w u u1 1 1 2 2
1
1( ) = + −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ]
γ
θ αs f
Not surprisingly, all else being equal, the higher the additional second-
period utility that comes with success, u u2 2s fα( ) −( ), the higher the employee’s
first-period search effort.
Management’s first-period maximization problem also has a two-period
perspective and can be written as:
w
q w w q w
1
1 1 1 2 1 1 21max ( ) − + ( )( ) + − ( )( ){ }θ π α πs f
which implies an optimal first-period wage of:
w u u1 2 2 2 2
1
2
2 1α θ π α π α( ) = −( ) + ( ) −( ) − ( ) −( )[ ]s f s f
The first-period bonus is positively associated with the additional
second-period profit that is generated by success, π α π2 2s f( ) −( ). However, the
optimal bonus is decreasing in u u2 2s fα( ) −( ), as w1 and u u2 2s fα( ) −( ) are substi-
tutes in providing incentives.
Inserting w1(α) into the profit and utility functions yields total profit
Π(α) and total utility U(α) in equilibrium:
Π α
γ
π α π α π( ) = + ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ] +1
4
1 2 2 2 2
2
2
s f s f fu u (7)
U u u uα
γ
π α π α( ) = + ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ] +1
8
1 2 2 2 2
2
2
s f s f f (8)
At first glance, it might seem surprising that each party benefits from a
ceteris paribus increase in the other party’s second-period pay-off in the case
of first-period success. Total employee utility increases in π α2s ( ), because a
higher π α2s ( ) enhances management’s willingness to incentivize first-period
search effort. Total profit increases in u2s α( ), because the employee’s first-
period search effort is increasing in u2s α( ). As a consequence management
takes account of the employee’s utility, and is willing to sacrifice some of its
second-period profit so long as doing so increases the second-period surplus,
π α α2 2s s( ) + ( )u .
4.1 Inertia
The ex ante effects of inertia can be evaluated by comparing the total equi-
librium and benchmark pay-offs. Solving for the first-period decisions in the
same way as above, total benchmark pay-offs can be derived as:
Π b b f b f fα
γ
π α π α π( ) = + ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ] +1
4
1 2 2 2 2
2
2u u (9)
U u u ub b f b f fα
γ
π α π α( ) = + ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ] +1
8
1 2 2 2 2
2
2 (10)
Comparing Πb(α) and Π(α) shows that:
Π Πα α α( ) ≥ ( ) ⇔ ( ) ≥b ΔS2 0 (11)
where ΔS u u2 2 2 2 2α π α α π α α( ) = ( ) + ( ) − ( ) + ( ): ( )s s b b . Hence, the effect of inertia
on total profit and utility can be evaluated by comparing the second-period
surplus in case of first-period success in equilibrium to the benchmark case.
Note that any pure redistributional effects of inertia are inconsequential from
an ex ante perspective.
In the following proposition, equation (11) is used to establish the ex
ante effects of inertia.
Proposition 1: The effect of inertia on the players’ total pay-offs:
(i) For 1 4 2 4γ α θ γ< ≤ −( ) , inertia increases employee utility and firm
profit. It results in higher first-period and second-period search efforts
compared with the benchmark.
(ii) For 2 4 1 4−( ) < <θ γ α θγ , inertia decreases employee utility and firm
profit. It results in lower first-period and second-period search efforts
compared with the benchmark.
Proposition 1 shows that inertia has very different consequences depend-
ing on the degree of stability of the environment and the ensuing reaction of
management to the inertial tendency that arises following first-period success.
In case (i) of the proposition, the degree of stability is sufficiently high for
inertia to arise, but still low enough to make it profitable for management to
induce searching. Inertia, therefore, results in a higher bonus in the second
period. Interestingly, this stimulates search efforts not just in the second
period. The employee foresees that first-period success will result in higher-
powered incentives and higher informational rents in the second period com-
pared with the benchmark case and, thus, exerts a higher effort also in the
first period. Inertia brings the search effort closer to the one that a hypotheti-
cal owner-manager (who maximizes total surplus) would choose, and results
in larger total surplus compared with the benchmark, ΔS2(α) ≥ 0.8 The
employee and management share this additional surplus—and both benefit
from inertia. This illustrates how inertia can serve as a commitment device for
management to offer higher-powered incentives with higher informational
rents. Because the level of search effort is positively related to innovation, the
presence of (not too strong) inertial tendencies may not only generate addi-
tional profit but also spur innovation. Thus, focusing exclusively on the
negative effect of inertia on second period profit may ignore important
dynamic effects.
In case (ii), the inertial tendency is sufficiently strong that it is not
profitable for management to induce searching in the second period.
However, searching would be total surplus enhancing since the employee
would enjoy additional informational rents—rents that management does
not internalize in deciding about the incentive scheme in the second period.
The choice not to induce searching undermines the employee’s first-period
search effort. Hence, inertia results in lower search efforts in both periods as
well as a reduction in total surplus compared with the benchmark. Since
employee and shareholders split the loss in total surplus, inertia is costly.
Here, management is hurt by its inability to commit to inducing searching in
8There is a general problem in the model of underinvestment in effort resulting from the moral
hazard problem and management’s inability to extract the employee’s informational rents.
Total surplus, therefore, is increasing in the search effort in the relevant range.
the second period. Innovation suffers in the period in which inertia arises, and
also the first-period success rate is compromised in anticipation of inertia.
Figure 2 illustrates the possibly dramatic differences in total profit for
the two inertia regimes. Because of the opposing effects of inertia on
employee search, a small increase in the stability of the environment may lead
to a large decrease in profits.
5 IMPLICATIONS
5.1 The Employee’s Ability to Appropriate Benefits
In the absence of inertia, the firm’s expected profit is independent of the
employee’s ability to appropriate benefits while implementing the project,
FIG. 2. The Possibly Dramatic Differences in Total Profit for the Two Inertia Regimes
The figure depicts the total profit, Π(α), the second-period profit, π α2s ( ), and the difference
in second-period surplus in the equilibrium and in the benchmark cases, ΔS2(α), as a
function of α.
(1 − θ). This is because a lower level of (1 − θ) can be replaced by an increase in
the bonus leaving the firm’s profit unchanged. If, on the other hand, inertia is
present, the firm’s profit depends on (1 − θ) because its value has an effect on
whether search is induced in the second period (see Proposition 1): a higher
(1 − θ) reduces the firm’s second-period profit if searching is not induced,
making the management more inclined to set a bonus that generates search.
Proposition 2: For any α γ θ γ∈( )1 4 1 4, , there exist admissible parameters in
which the total profit strictly increases if the employee’s ability to appropriate
rents, (1 − θ), increases. The opposite does not hold.
Proposition 2 follows from the observation that an increase in (1 − θ)
expands (contracts) the region characterized in Proposition 1 for which
inertia increases (decreases) the total pay-off to management and employee.
This result has implications for job design. For example, management may
limit its monitoring of how the employee runs a project. This increases the
employee’s ability to expand her personal network and further her career, or
to enjoy perquisites.9
An alternative interpretation of (1 − θ) is that it represents the salary that
the employee must be paid to avoid her leaving the firm and implementing the
project elsewhere. One implication of Proposition 2, then, is that manage-
ment may not find it optimal to limit the employee’s bargaining power in
retention negotiations. This can be achieved, for example, by not including a
non-compete clause in the employment contract, or by providing the
employee with sole access to critical assets.10
5.2 Restructuring
For the range 2 4 1 4−( ) < ≤θ γ α θ γ , it is too expensive to provide the
employee with monetary incentives to search for a new project. Since the
lack of search effort reduces second-period profit, management has an
incentive to use non-contractual instruments of incentive provision to
induce searching. To do so, management can use its ownership rights to
restructure the employee’s access to the firm’s assets. One way to provide
search incentives is to reorganize the firm in the second period in such a way
that the employees’ individual tasks and responsibilities change. Reorgani-
zation forces employees to find ways to accomplish their new tasks effi-
ciently and to invest in acquiring information in the second period. Thus,
9In arguing that granting the employee more autonomy alleviates the firm’s commitment
problem and results in higher-powered incentives, the model complements arguments that
emphasize the incentive effects of autonomy and the possibility to separate different types
of employees (see Gambardella et al., 2010).
10See Feinstein and Stein (1988) for the effect of task assignment on employee bargaining power.
for the given parameter range, the resulting profit is identical to the profit in
the benchmark case.11
Alternatively, instead of reorganizing tasks, management can maintain
constant assignment of tasks to positions, but rotate employees among posi-
tions. Another possibility would be to hire new employees every period.
While the focus of these instruments is on the person/employee rather than
the rearrangement of tasks, they mean that the employee is unable to rely on
past experience for the performance of her (new) task. Therefore, if one
abstracts from transaction costs, the use of these instruments has identical
implications to a reorganization.12 In the following, we use the term restruc-
turing to refer to all three types of instruments.
For the range 1 4 2 4γ α θ γ< ≤ −( ) management has an incentive to
restructure in order to reduce the bonus necessary to induce searching.
However, the anticipated restructuring decision reduces the employee’s first-
period effort and total profit. Thus, the possibility to restructure may cause a
time-inconsistency problem for management.
Proposition 3: If management can restructure after the first period, it will do
so for all parameters where inertia arises, α γ θ γ∈( )1 4 1 4, . Restructuring
decreases total profit for 1 4 2 4γ α θ γ< ≤ −( ) but increases it for
2 4 1 4−( ) < <θ γ α θγ .
Because management finds it ex post optimal to apply restructuring
measures in cases where doing so reduces total profit, it may have an incentive
to commit to not applying such measures. Management may try to secure
commitment power by increasing the cost of restructuring. To make both
reorganization and job rotation more costly, management can, for example,
choose an employment structure that is dominated by specialists rather than
generalists. Hiring predominantly specialists entails higher costs of employee
re-training when their tasks change.13 In the context of employment duration,
management may be able to commit to not replacing successful employees
after the first period by offering severance pay. Another possibility would be
to include continued employment into the contract as a part of the reward for
success, a solution that resembles the academic system of tenure (McPherson
and Winston, 1983).
11We assume that a reorganization does not introduce any costs or benefits apart from those
arising endogenously due to information being destroyed or created. The introduction of an
explicit cost does not provide any additional insights because it reduces the incentives to
reorganize in a straightforward manner.
12Job rotation is a policy commonly thought to facilitate employee learning (Campion et al.,
1994). Our analysis is consistent with this explanation, but stresses that while job rotation
provides new possibilities for employee learning, it increases the need for learning as well.
13Some evidence supporting this notion is provided in Eriksson and Ortega (2006), who show
that the use of job rotation is negatively correlated to the heterogeneity of the firm’s
workforce.
6 DISCUSSION: ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTING ASSUMPTIONS AND
MULTIPLE PERIODS
In this section, we briefly and informally outline the results under two alter-
native contracting assumptions: two-period contracts and a verifiable change
of project. Additionally, to demonstrate the robustness of our result we
sketch some implications if we extend the model to three periods. Details of
the analyses are available from the authors upon request.
6.1 Optimal Two-period Contract
Suppose that management is able to commit to a complete, two-period
contract where the bonuses for all contingencies are specified in the employ-
ment contract at the beginning of period 1. The optimal two-period contract
has the following general features:
1. w1(α) is set low, possibly equal to zero, in order to extract the employee’s
informational rents.
2. w2s α( ) is set high, possibly equal to θ for which the employee becomes the
residual claimant.
3. w2f is distorted below the bonus level that maximizes the second period
profit.
Under the optimal two-period contract, a part of the reward for first-
period success is a higher bonus in the second period. As mentioned in the
introduction, this is a common result in analyses of dynamic moral hazard
problems. The intuition is that deferred compensation provides the employee
with an incentive to exert effort in both periods while, at the same time,
minimizing the employee’s informational rents. Notice also that w2f is opti-
mally distorted below the level that maximizes the second-period profit in
order to obtain a higher search effort in the first period.14
It is interesting that deferred compensation also alleviates the problem of
inertia. It turns out that if the wealth constraint does not bind in the first
period (w1(α) > 0), an employee who experienced first-period success is ren-
dered the residual claimant in the following period w2s α θ( ) =( ). The employee
will choose the search effort that maximizes total surplus, and inertia will not
arise. However, if the wealth constraint binds (w1(α) = 0), the bonus is
reduced w2s α θ( ) <( ) in order to increase the firm’s share of the surplus
created. In this case, the employee’s incentive to search for a new project is
reduced, and inertia may arise. Therefore, better contracting possibilities
reduce, but do not necessarily eliminate inertia.
14Formally, starting from the bonus level that maximizes the second-period profit, a marginal
decrease in w2f results in a first-order increase in first-period profit due to a higher first-
period search effort, but in only a second-order decrease in second-period profit. The
optimal w2f is thus strictly smaller than the level maximizing second-period profit.
6.2 Verifiable Change of Project
We have assumed that the project details are information private to the
employee. Circumstances may exist in which project details are verifiable. In
this case, it would be possible to make the bonus payment contingent on
whether x1∗ is implemented again, and management could offer a contract
that specifies a strictly positive bonus if, and only if, a project different from
x1∗ is implemented and is successful. This type of contract relaxes the search
constraint, because an employee who has experienced first-period success
cannot obtain the bonus without searching again. Thus, region (ii) of Propo-
sition 1 where inertia reduces pay-offs is eliminated. However, region (i) of
the proposition, where inertia increases pay-offs, also shrinks. Therefore, the
possibility to contract on project details involves a time-inconsistency
problem similar to that faced by management in the case of restructuring.
6.3 Three Periods
In case there are three periods rather than two, both the firm’s and the
employee’s third period actions are described by those of the main model in
period 2 and, thus, inertia arises for identical parameters. Anticipating the
behavior in the third period affects the employee’s search incentives in the
period 2 as well as the firm’s choice of bonus. For example, for the parameter
range of α in which harmful inertia occurs in period 3, the employee antici-
pates being offered a zero bonus in the following period. This renders it
expensive for the firm to motivate second-period searching, which tends to
result in a zero bonus offer in that period. The opposite occurs for parameters
of α that are associated with beneficial inertia. In other words, the effects of
inertia in later periods propagates to earlier periods implying that the model’s
results are robust to increasing the number of periods studied.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we develop a simple principal–agent model to analyze inertia
that results from past success. An employee who discovered a successful
project in the previous period is reluctant to invest effort in searching again,
because the old project may be successful again. We show that, in this
situation, monetary incentives are not necessarily an effective tool for induc-
ing search effort. The problem for management is that a bonus for good
performance, intended to encourage searching, also increases the employee’s
pay-off from not searching. This problem is particularly pronounced in envi-
ronments that are sufficiently volatile to make searching worthwhile, but
sufficiently stable to exacerbate the agency problem.
Management’s reaction to the employee’s reluctance to search is either
to increase the power of financial incentives or to give up altogether on
encouraging search effort. We show that these two reactions have very dif-
ferent implications for total profit. High-powered incentives serve as addi-
tional rewards for success, which increases the employee’s search efforts and
the firm’s total profit. However, if search is abandoned due to the severity of
the agency problem, total profit is reduced.
We demonstrate that allowing the employee to appropriate a certain
fraction of project surplus, for example, by limiting the monitoring of how
the employee runs the project, can be beneficial for the firm because manage-
ment is more inclined to counter inertial tendencies by offering high-powered
incentives. We show also that restructuring, in the form of reorganization,
job rotation or short-term employment forces employees to search in the
second period, but may create a time-inconsistency problem. In particular,
these policies may increase second-period profit, but still decrease total profit
because initial search efforts are undermined. Firms, therefore, may have an
incentive to commit to not restructuring—for example, by making hiring or
investment decisions that increase the cost of restructuring.
An interesting issue that arises from this analysis is the interdependency
between firm level decisions and industry effects. In this paper we examined
how the stability of the environment influences decision-making inside the
firm. The stability of the environment, in turn, is a result of the sum of the
decisions made by the firms in the industry, which suggests a theory of inertia
and industry evolution. We leave this and other issues to future research.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that the employee searches for a new project. When choosing her search
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where the left-hand side is the expected utility from exerting the search effort q2(w2)
and the right-hand side is the expected utility from not searching. This condition
reduces to equation (1) in Lemma 1. Notice that equation (1) implies that x2 is a more




If the management specifies in the contract that project x2 is implemented in period
2, it solves the following problem:
w
w q w w q w
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where equation (A1) has been used.
Due to the quadratic nature of the effort cost function, the resulting effort level









Alternatively, the management can choose not to specify whether searching












































































Comparing π2X and π2Y yields the benchmark reported in Lemma 2.
Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that the management wishes to induce searching. Using equation (A1), the
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The alternative option for the management is not to encourage searching and to
optimally set w2 0Y = . The pay-offs are then given by equation (A2), and the proof
follows then directly from comparing π2X and π2Y.
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider case (i). Equation (11) shows that inertia increases firm profit and employee
utility if and only if ΔS2(α) ≥ 0. In case (i), ΔS2 22 2 3 8α α γα γ( ) = − − , which is
increasing in α in the region of the parameter space considered. Furthermore, as
ΔE(S2) → 0 for α γ→1 4 , it follows that ΔS2(α) > 0 for 1 4 2 4γ α θ γ< ≤ −( ) .
Consider the search efforts. The equilibrium search effort in the second period is
q w q w2 2 2 22 1 2s b( ) = > = ( )α γ as 1 4γ α< . The equilibrium search effort in the first
period is q u u1 2 2 2 21 2α π α π α γ( ) = + ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ]s f s f . In the benchmark case, the first-
period search effort is q u u1 2 2 2 21 2b b f b fα π α π α γ( ) = + ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )[ ] . Since ΔS2(α) > 0, it
follows that q q1 1 0α α( ) > ( ) >b , which completes the proof for case (i). The proof for
case (ii) follows similar steps.
Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the range of parameters for which inertia arises. Since the second-period
pay-offs to the employee and the firm are independent of (1 − θ) in the benchmark
case, the total profit in the benchmark case Πb(α) is also independent of α. Hence, the
statement regarding cases (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1 implies that the firm’s total profit
is strictly higher in case (i) than in case (ii). An increase in (1 − θ) expands the set of
remaining parameters for case (i) to obtain. This proves the first part of the proposi-
tion. The second part is given, because within cases (i) and (ii), total profit is inde-
pendent of (1 − θ).
Appendix F
Proof of Proposition 3
The management has an incentive to restructuring for all parameters such that inertia
arises. If the employee foresees that a restructuring will take place, it is as if α = 0, and
total profit is equal to Π 0 1 2( ) = γ . Comparing Π(0) and Π(α) yields the results
reported in the proposition.
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